Social Contract Theories: Rawls and Nozick
I. Social Contract Theory — Its Origin, Development, and Terms
“A war of all against all, in which the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”[1] This is how 17th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes described a world without social contracts — a world he called “the state of nature” in his magnum opus, Leviathan.[2] Hobbes’s dramatized state of nature casts bands of wandering savages exploiting weak individuals, and weak individuals transiently grouping up to overwhelm stronger individuals, in a free-for-all, all-or-nothing game of life where groups are ephemeral, lack loyalty, and its members exclusively act to maximize their own individual benefit. Hobbes’s conception of the state of nature presupposes two most salient claims: individuals act in self-interest, and we would all be better off by cooperating in a society rather than competing in the state of nature.[3] The claims made within Leviathan, such as those, are often heralded as the inception of Social Contract Theory,[4] a theory which today can refer to a moral philosophy, a political philosophy, or both.[5]
This paper concerns Social Contract Theory’s use as a political theory, including the conditions of a social contract, the implications of a social contract, the use of a social contract as a procedure for constructing society and governance, and the values principally involved in the social contract, such as liberty and legitimacy. Two conditions of a social contract are stated above: there is an assumption that individuals will act in self-interest, and individuals will be better off as a part of the social contract than they were (or would be) if they weren’t a part of the social contract. If people are assumed free in the state of nature (free to kill, to steal, etc.), then they are also at risk of others exercising harmful liberties in return. In the formation of a social contract, individuals sacrifice liberties for rules that serve their self-interest and make them better off. For example, a social contract that disallows murder would strip an individual’s liberty of killing those who have vexed him or her, but now the individual will live a life that is not as “nasty, brutish, and short.” That is, there are “beneficial rules that require cooperation and punish betrayal.”[6] These rules, however, are nothing if not enforced, so this necessitates a third condition of a social contract: a legitimate authority to punish breaches of the contract.
The aforementioned authority derives from the consent of those within the contract, and this is the fourth and final major condition of a social contract: the contract must be mutually agreed upon and consented to by those within the social contract.[7] The greatest issue here is that individuals are born into a state with rules that they cannot consent to at birth, and a state’s citizens are so numerous that they cannot all agree on rules if each person were to act in self-interest. The small bandage for this gushing issue is the concept of tacit consent, which assumes consent to the rules of a state unless explicitly stated otherwise, and the imperfect method of exiting a social contract in this case is emigration since states are geographically bound. This issue, in addition to the emergence of positivism and expressivism,[8] caused a dormancy in social contract theory’s relevance until 20th century philosopher John Rawls reimagined Social Contract Theory with his “Theory of Justice.”[9]
II. John Rawls and the Theory of Justice
John Rawls reinvented Social Contract Theory by devising a procedure to construct social contracts that would eliminate issues regarding tacit consent and disagreement over the contract. Rawls’s procedure is better understood by following the logical narrative of philosopher Jonathan Wolff as he describes two individuals playing a game then reaching a disagreement.[10] In Wolff’s example, the individuals would first think to defer to the previously agreed upon rules of the game, the social contract in this instance; however, there might not be a previously written rule for their particular disagreement. If no rule exists to resolve their disagreement, the next logical step would be to defer to an impartial spectator, but an impartial spectator might not be present. If there is no prior rule and no impartial spectator, then the individuals need to problem-solve abstractly. The third order of deference would be to imagine a hypothetical spectator; each individual would imagine a person they know mutually, and it is likely they could determine who that hypothetical spectator would agree with. This solution still has an issue: the hypothetical person might have a bias for one of the individuals. So finally, the logical procedure for settling disputes and to form contracts is to imagine a hypothetical spectator who is impartial to the individuals. This example is meant to simplify and justify the logic of Rawls’s procedure; his Theory of Justice goes far beyond the simple advice of “imagine an impartial spectator.”
John Rawls describes his impartial spectator as a person in a very unique position that removes all biases and promotes the construction of the ideal social contract.[11] This person is an amnesiac who does not know their sex, race, age, religion, socio-economic status, talents (or lack thereof), etc. This person knows nothing of who they are in life, they don’t know how their society is currently arranged, and they are ignorant of “the good;”[12] however, this person is rational with all necessary reasoning abilities. In other words, they could solve Sudoku but not crosswords. Rawls refers to this position as the veil of ignorance, and this is the individual who is tasked with creating a social contract for a state; this individual is the impartial spectator. The individual will act in self-interest according to Social Contract Theory, but they cannot favor a group since they don’t know which group they belong to. A unique property of this individual is that disagreements are theoretically impossible; all impartial spectators in this position would be exact copies of one another, and they should create the same social contract every time. This was the first procedure arrived at by pure reason that solves the issues of contract disagreement and tacit consent. Contract disagreement is solved by all individuals under the veil of ignorance theoretically reaching the same conclusion, and tacit consent is justifiably assumed since this conclusion was created by the free, equal, rational, impartial spectator. Rawls, however, makes one more assumption about the amnesiac: they have a concept of primary goods, which Rawls outlines as liberty[13], opportunity, wealth, and social bases of self-respect.[14] Naturally, Rawls believes this amnesiac would conclude with a society that maximizes the primary goods no matter who they are in society, and this society would revolve around two principles: The Fair Liberty Principle and The Fair Opportunity Principle.
The Fair Liberty Principle and The Fair Opportunity Principle could conceivably exist in three scenarios: a society of discriminatory liberties and opportunities, a society of extensive liberties and opportunities, or a society of limited liberties and opportunities. A society of discriminatory liberties and opportunities would allot liberties and opportunities unequally across its individuals, and this scenario is eliminated under the veil of ignorance since the amnesiac wouldn’t allot one group (sex, race, etc.) more liberties and opportunities than another group if the amnesiac acted in self-interest, since they don’t know which group they belong to and wouldn’t short himself or herself. A society of extensive liberties wouldn’t limit liberties, and a society of limited liberties would limit liberties across all individuals — the same is true for societies of extensive and limited opportunities. Rawls acquiesces that a society of limited liberties and opportunities is necessary in instances of emergency, but the amnesiac would design society under normal, non-emergency conditions; therefore, the amnesiac would design a society of extensive liberties and opportunities. There is, however, a branch of The Fair Opportunity Principle called The Difference Principle, and Rawls’s Difference Principle is where most contentions with his conclusion arise.
The Difference Principle concerns wealth, and it differs from the two previous principles in that Rawls does not believe wealth should equalize.[15] Rawls argues that society that equalizes wealth would level everyone down by removing incentives and removing the possibility of wealthier individuals from improving society through innovation. If it is necessary for a social contract to make everyone better off and wealth disparity would make everyone better off, then it is necessary for a society to have a disparity in wealth. Rawls justifies this difference with a caveat that adheres to the respective logic: inequalities in wealth should be accepted if — and only if — they make us all better off; the worst off should be as well off as possible.[16] The reason that wealth disparities must make the least-advantaged better off is because that is the only system in which it is certain that wealthier groups are not exploiting less advantaged groups for further benefit. The contentions with The Difference Principle usually take one of two extreme positions: wealth should be equal as well, or wealth should not be redistributed or repurposed at all. Rawls’s position takes middle ground with a logical justification which also allows room to be overridden: Rawls states his principles have a “lexicographic order,” so The Fair Liberty Principle must never be overridden, The Fair Opportunity Principle may be overridden by The Fair Liberty Principle, and The Difference Principle may be overridden by the previous two principles. Unless necessary in an instance, none of the principles may be overridden. Rawls’s Theory of Justice is remarkably thorough in both its procedure and conclusion, but it’s not exempt from due criticism.
There are two major issues with Rawls’s Theory of Justice that I’ve identified: contradictory assumptions regarding self-interest and a relatively unreasoned assumption regarding his primary goods. It is an assumption of all social contracts that individuals act in self-interest. Rawls posits that his amnesiac will act in self-interest by designing a society that makes everyone within the society better off, but the issue with voluntarily thinking under the veil of ignorance is that someone in a higher position of society wouldn’t be acting in self-interest to voluntarily self-induce the veil of ignorance. That is, an amnesiac acting in self-interest would create Rawls’s contract, but individuals are not amnesiacs, and they wouldn’t all create Rawls’s contract if they acted in self-interest. Secondly, Rawls assumes that the amnesiac should create a contract around liberties, opportunities, and wealth. I don’t personally disagree with this, but I could see people disagreeing with those starting points, especially wealth. Though, even if Rawls’s primary goods and principles were selected, the method of quantifying wealth disparity’s extent could be determined by numerous mechanisms and readings; there could still be disagreement amongst amnesiacs under the veil of ignorance with Rawls’s principles.
III. Robert Nozick and Theory of Entitlement
The most ardent opponent to John Rawls is fellow social contract theorist Robert Nozick. Nozick published his most influential book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, three years after Rawls’s Theory of Justice as a response and an alternative. The appeal of Nozick’s proposed contract lies in its simplicity: according to Nozick’s contract, an individual cannot harm another individual and cannot steal from another individual (with the exception of preventing or undoing a past infarction). Nozick additionally proposes what he calls a Justice in Holdings.[17] Similar to Rawls, Nozick’s Justice is composed of two primary principles which jointly constitute his Theory of Entitlement: The Principle of Justice in Acquisition and The Principle of Justice in Transfer. Nozick’s Theory of Entitlement states that holdings are justly entitled if their attainment is in accordance with the two principles — that is, any holding acquired must either have not been previously entitled to someone else, or it must be consensually transferred to the new holder.
An issue with Nozick’s Justice of Holdings which he acknowledges in Chapter 7 of Anarchy, State, and Utopia is the “rectification of historical injustices.” Historical injustices refer to the obvious fact that much of what individuals claim holdings on today were attained at some point in history by murder, theft, etc., so they aren’t justly entitled holdings. Nozick acknowledges this issue and proposes some possible solutions, but nothing definitive.[18] He suggests possibly taxing those who likely benefited from unjust transfers to redistribute wealth to those who likely lost holdings due to unjust transfers. He also mentions an end-state possibly outlining how to redistribute wealth, but he is highly critical of end-state and patterned principles.[19] Nozick acknowledges a necessity for a principle that rectifies past historical injustices, but he doesn’t offer a tenable principle himself. In fact, much of Nozick’s position is less of a grounding for his own contract and more of a counterargument for Rawls’s contract.
In response to Rawls’s suggestion that wealth ought to be taxed and redistributed to or repurposed for the least advantaged, Nozick composed the Wilt Chamberlain argument to emphasize the futility and injustice of equalizing wealth. In summary, the argument is that all people start at the same income, but many people want to pay to see Wilt Chamberlain play basketball. Chamberlain doesn’t want to play unless he is paid, so he accepts the many transfers and consequently is far wealthier than all of the other individuals by (according to Nozick) just transfer of holdings. It would be wrong to deny individuals the right to pay Chamberlain since everyone would be better off and acting in self-interest in this scenario, so Nozick uses this hypothetical instance to suggest that any end-state principle must be unjust.[20] The issue with this argument is that it’s all-or-nothing: there is either no end-state model or only an end-state model, and all transfers of holdings are the same, including taxes. In reality, Rawls, and like-minded thinkers, would take no issue with consensual transfers such as paying someone to play basketball. Though, Rawls and others do distinguish a transfer of wealth for a service from taxation. Taxation acts to converge wealth disparity to a degree settled upon by the social contract of the state, and it’s unlikely the agreed upon contract would decree equivalent incomes for all individuals as Nozick suggested in his Chamberlain argument. The extremes of his argument make it stronger, but it is also deceptive.
An additional issue with Nozick’s contract is the role of the state. Nozick’s state is anarcho-libertarian, and it’s referred to as the Night Watchmen State. The Night Watchman State punishes those who do harm and corrects unjust transfers, and it is the only service that requires taxation of individuals.[21] This assumes a minimalist state, but it was also mentioned that the Night Watchman State could exist as private entities that enforce the Justice in Holdings as well as other rules agreed upon by the patrons of this service. The issue with private protective associations is that it seems individuals would be allowed to enforce their own rules, and poorer individuals would not be protected within certain domains.
In addition to the criticisms interspersed above, I have two fundamental criticisms of Nozick’s proposed contract. Firstly, his selection of holdings as the central component of his contract seems arbitrary and unreasonable. Rawls argued his position from first principles with convincing logic while Nozick’s championing of holdings seemed arbitrary and unfounded, especially since he didn’t also prioritize more prima facie primary goods such as basic liberties or opportunity. Considering holdings a primary good with its respective principles becomes more ridiculous as you recognize the impossibility of righting all of the unjust transfers throughout history — political theories and ethical theories must be feasible. Secondly, the historical entitlement model isn’t sustainable. It is a necessary condition of a social contract that everyone within a contract must be better off within the contract than they were (or would be) outside the contract. Inheritance across time creates an ever-increasing, insurmountable divergence of wealth. As time goes on, the benefit of poor groups exiting the social contract to violently kill and steal from the wealthier groups increases. This was determined experimentally, and it is measured via the Gini coefficient. Of course, the necessity for protection would cause wealthier groups to pay the Night Watchman State more, and this would increase the size of the state, causing the unwinding of the contract from both sides. In the end, a minimalist state (or a conglomeration of private protective agencies) without an end-state wealth model — and abiding by Nozick’s principles — isn’t sustainable.
IV. Concluding Thoughts
Social Contract Theories hold a unique position as theories for both politics and morality. Their consideration of values, acknowledgement of human nature, and necessity to improve the lives of those within the contract appeal to me. When used as the framework for a political system, I personally think there should be more prevalent notions of rights and responsibilities. I define rights as the benefits an individual receives under a social contract — and this must always include the liberties of an ideal civil and liberal democracy — and responsibilities are an individual’s duty to uphold the rights of others within the contract. This notion expects individuals to simultaneously act both selfishly and selflessly to promote their own betterment as well as others’ betterment.
In line with my view of bettering the individual and his or her society simultaneously, I find Rawls’s Theory of Justice far more compelling than Nozick’s Theory of Entitlement. Not being an amnesiac, I find Rawls’s contract fairer and more reasonable. And if I were an amnesiac with great reasoning skills, I believe I would construct a contract very similar to Rawls’s, but perhaps by a slightly different interpretation of his outlined principles. Rawls’s Theory of Justice isn’t perfect, but it’s very logically constructed, and I don’t know of a better political theory at the moment.
I respect and find some appeal in Nozick’s Theory of Entitlement, but it doesn’t seem well-supported, and I don’t think that it would be a sustainable model unless the major issues were addressed, such as rectification of historically unjust transfers, the inevitably increasing wealth disparity, and the interests of the publicly-funded state and/or private protective associations with private interests.
The development of a superior theory of justice will likely come about by deeply deliberating the arguments composed by both of these philosophers. I believe that the conclusion reached by this future theory will seem quite obvious once it’s written, and I also believe that the procedure used to arrive at this conclusion will be identical to or very similar to Rawls’s veil of ignorance, which I consider one of the most revolutionary philosophical ideas of this past century.
[1] Shafer-Landau, Russ. The Fundamentals of Ethics. 4th ed., Oxford University Press, 2018. p.199.
[2] Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Boom, 2007.
[3] Shafer-Landau, Russ. The Fundamentals of Ethics. 4th ed., Oxford University Press, 2018. p.196.
[4] It is also called “Contractarianism” and “Contractualism;” however, these two terms are sometimes used to distinguish between two more nuanced types of Social Contract Theory. The term “Social Contract Theory” comes from the title of philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s book on the subject, The Social Contract.
[5] It should also be noted that elements of modern Social Contract Theory are discussed at length in works prior to Leviathan, especially in Plato’s Republic. The necessary components of modern Social Contract Theory for this paper are exhaustively covered by Thomas Hobbes, John Rawls, and Robert Nozick, so Rousseau’s The Social Contract and Plato’s Republic won’t be discussed further here.
[6] Shafer-Landau, Russ. The Fundamentals of Ethics. 4th ed., Oxford University Press, 2018. p.199.
[7] Cudd, Ann, and Seena Eftekhari. “Contractarianism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 15 Mar. 2017, plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism/.
[8] Positivism was a philosophical movement that championed a posteriori knowledge, stating that the only knowable facts are arrived at by experiment and by axiomatic logic. Positivism subsequently claimed that anything pertaining to theology, morality, and values wasn’t provable, so it wasn’t worth discussing. Expressivism was the movement that viewed any moral statement as merely an expression of emotion on the subject (e.g., stating “Murder is wrong” equates to stating “I don’t like murder” or “Murder makes me feels bad”).
[9] Wolff, Jonathan. “Political Philosophy & Rawls’ Theory of Justice.” YouTube, Philosophy Overdose, 16 Oct. 2017, www.youtube.com/watch?v=XwVqDBB9PwM. A recording of philosopher Jonathan Wolff’s discussion on Rawls’s Theory of Justice.
[10] Wolff, Jonathan. “Political Philosophy & Rawls’ Theory of Justice.”
[11] Wenar, Leif. “John Rawls.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 9 Jan. 2017, plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/.
[12] “Ignorant of the good” means the person has no memory desires and no pre-conceptions of justice; that is, the social contract will be constructed independently of any pre-existing ethical framework.
[13] Rawls liberties consist of all the ideal civil and political liberties in a liberal democracy: freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, suffrage, habeas corpus, freedom to run for office, a right to life, a right to property, etc.
[14] Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999.
[15] Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999.
[16] Wenar, Leif. “John Rawls.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 9 Jan. 2017, plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/.
[17] Mack, Eric. “Robert Nozick’s Political Philosophy.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 15 June 2018, plato.stanford.edu/entries/nozick-political/.
[18] Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books, 2013.
[19] An end-state principle would be a principle that makes a judgment of justice based on wealth disparity rather than what led to the disparity. Nozick’s historical entitlement model gauges justice not by the distribution but by how the distribution came about. “If each person’s holdings are just, then the total set (distribution) of holdings is just.”
[20] Dworkin, Ronald. “Rawls vs Nozick.” YouTube, Philosophy Overdose, 12 Mar. 2018, www.youtube.com/watch?v=49-hUPHXRbk. A recording of philosopher Ronald Dworkin discussing Rawls and Nozick.
[21] Kateb, George. “The Night Watchman State.” The American Scholar, vol. 45, no. 1, 1976, pp. 816–826. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/41207372. Accessed 18 Dec. 2020.
